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Abstract
Multinational rms not only make acquisitions, but also frequently divest a¢ liates. A¢ liate
divestiture is the result of many factors, some internal and some external to the rm. Using
detailed condential survey data of Swedish multinationals, we are able to examine divestiture
decisions within the context of the world-wide a¢ liate network of the rm. In contrast, most
existing studies of multinational exit focus on one country only. A model of mergers and
acquisitions with nancing constraints generates predictions regarding the correlation between
a¢ liate size and the decision to sell. Consistent with this theory, we nd that larger a¢ liates are
more likely to be divested, but an increase in relative size of an a¢ liate reduces the probability
of divestiture. Additional network characteristics, the presence of other a¢ liates nearby and
sales of a¢ liates elsewhere, are also positively correlated with divestiture. We nd no support
for the notion of footloose multinationals.
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1 Introduction
It always pays to know when and what to buy. It also pays to know when and what to sell." -IBM
CEO Ginni Romerty
Many rms make frequent acquisitions, but just as important to companiessuccess are decisions
to divest certain parts of the rm. For example, IBM sold its PC business to Lenovo in 2004 and
its retail point-to-sale business to Toshiba in 2012. These divestments are part of Big Blues
restructuring e¤orts in recent years. Over time, the companys capabilities have moved away
from manufacturing, commodity sourcing and selling to software and services such as data center
management and enterprise systems integration.
Multinational a¢ liate divestiture is the result of a plethora of factors, some external and some
internal to the rm. Some plant sales, like IBMs, are motivated by strategic considerations such as
a decision to focus on core business and divest from non-core activities. Other sales are motivated by
relocation of activities to low-cost production sites in order to cut costs in increasingly competitive
world markets. Some are spurred by changes in the economic environment, which can a¤ect specic
industries. For example, in industries associated with the product life-cycle, plant divestitures may
occur as a result of signicant concurrent exits when the activity reaches maturity. Plant sales also
take place when multinationals merge: some operations are eliminated to avoid duplication and to
achieve the cost savings that often drive mergers in the rst place.
Traditional theories of foreign direct investment (FDI) shed light on trade and FDI ows, but
they do not adequately address the fundamental issue of the organizational form of a multinational
corporation (MNC) across borders, which includes both entry and exit. In recent years, the litera-
ture has started lling this void and has brought in tools from the theory of the rm to study the
boundaries of multinational rms.1 Concurrently, as once unavailable, rich, plant/rm level data
became available, we have seen a tremendous extension of micro data work exploring the behavior
of multinational rms in the US, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Portugal, Turkey, and Indonesia, among
others. Yet, there remains a gap in the existing empirical literature about the organization of
multinational rms across boundaries, in particular about the decisions of multinationals to divest
a¢ liates.
To understand the divestment decision of multinationals is important for a number of reasons.
MNCs are dominant in international trade2 and are a signicant presence in many labor markets.
A divestiture could thus result in loss of jobs as well as a worsening trade balance. Furthermore,
there is a presumption that multinationals are particularly footloose and exit quickly if the policy
environment worsens, for example due to changes in regulations or the tax code. If this is indeed
the case, then policy makers ought to take such consequences, which may be unrelated to policy
changes intended ones, into account. It has also been documented that aggregate productivity,
1See Antràs (2003), Antràs and Helpman (2004), Grossman and Helpman (2004) and Grossman, Helpman
and Szeidl (2006).
2According to UNCTAD, about 80 percent of world trade is connected to multinationals and about one
third is within MNCs, from parent to a¢ liate, a¢ liate to parent, or a¢ liate to a¢ liate.
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the most important driver of aggregate growth, is heavily inuenced by changes at the micro level,
which include both entry and exit (Syverson, 2011). The existing literature has little to say about
what factors drive rms to divest a¢ liates. To shed more light on these decisions is the primary
motivation of this paper.
We begin with the model of Berg, Norbäck and Persson (2012), who analyze mergers and
acquisitions with nancial constraints. Here, the primary motive of a rm to divest an a¢ liate is
to nance other investments in the MNCs network. The main assumption underlying the model
is that nancial constraints a¤ect rms cost of capital, which, in turn, a¤ects their ability to
conduct investment after an ownership transfer. Investments in an a¢ liate improve the quality of its
productive assets. However, since nancing costs increase in external borrowing, the MNC cannot
nance investment to improve several or all a¢ liates, but must divest in order to lower borrowing
costs and thus be able to invest in and restructure remaining a¢ liates. Conversely, the acquiring
rms borrowing costs increase, which constrains its ability to make productive investments.
The simple model generates two results that we take as a starting point for the empirical
analysis. First, the MNC can only sell an a¢ liate if the a¢ liate has su¢ ciently high quality assets.
Given its cash constraint following an acquisition, a buyer requires a minimum quality a¢ liate for
it to add value to its business. Assuming that the quality of assets is correlated with the size of
an a¢ liate, this result implies that an MNC will only be able to sell an a¢ liate with su¢ cient
size, implying a positive correlation between size and divestiture. This is contrary to much of
the economics literature, which posits a positive relationship between size and survival (Dunne,
Roberts and Samuelson, 1989; Dunne, Klimek and Roberts, 2005). However, it is consistent with
a nascent literature in the economics of innovation where a higher citation count, implying better
patent quality, is positively correlated with the amount of innovation transfers (Serrano, 2010).
What is new is that the model generates an additional prediction regarding the size of a¢ liates.
Among two a¢ liates that both have su¢ ciently high quality assets, the rm will only agree to sell
the a¢ liate with the relatively lower quality asset, implying a negative relationship between relative
size and divestiture. The intuition behind this result is that for the selling rm, the sale of the
smaller a¢ liate generates su¢ cient cash for the investment in the other a¢ liate, which has a higher
quality asset and thus raises prots by more. The acquiring rm agrees to this deal since it raises
joint prots which are shared via the agreed-upon sales price of the a¢ liate.
In order to empirically tests these predictions, we need data on the entire network of a¢ liates of
a rm. Most existing studies of multinational exit focus on one country only (for example, Taymaz
and Özler (2007) [Turkey], Alvarez and Görg (2009) [Chile], Greenaway, Gullstrand and Kneller
(2008) [Sweden], Inui et al. (2009) [Japan] and Baldwin and Yan (2010) [Canada]) and thus lack
information on the operations of exiting rms elsewhere. We take a condential survey data set of
Swedish multinationals that is uniquely suited to our purposes as it provides information on the
a¢ liate operations of a rm in all countries as well as the home market. Moreover, in the last
survey, rms were specically asked about plant divestitures and closures during the time since
the last survey ve years prior, as well as about start-ups and acquisitions. This avoids the often
encountered problems in other data, including census data, where it is not possible to make a
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distinction between a divestiture, which keeps an a¢ liate operating under new ownership, and true
exit from the market.
Conrming the predictions from theory, we do nd that larger a¢ liates are more likely to be
divested. As expected, we also nd that when an a¢ liate increases in size relative to the size of
other a¢ liates of the rm in the same country or region, the likelihood of being divested decreases.
In addition, when adding variables which capture the global network of the rm, we nd that the
existence of more and geographically close a¢ liates increases the likelihood of divestiture. Sales
of a¢ liates elsewhere are positively correlated with a sale, which is consistent with the notion of
common shocks hitting a rm. However, there is no support for the footloose nature of MNCs as
acquisition elsewhere is not correlated with divestiture.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses relevant related
literature. Section 3 sketches a model that gives rise to the size predictions. This is followed by a
detailed description of the data and the empirical framework, which includes a plethora of other
divestiture determinants at the rm, industry, and country level. Section 5 reports the empirical
results which are followed by conclusions.
2 Previous literature
The issue of entry and exit or divestiture has been discussed in the economics as well as the business
literature. We discuss relevant papers from both in turn. Seminal theoretical analyses in economics
such as Nelson and Winter (1982), Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), and Ericson and Pakes
(1995) have helped shape the recent empirical work which was made possible by the availability of
panel data on rms/plants in the last couple of decades. A great deal of stylized facts emerged from
these empirical papers on the role of heterogeneous rms, international trade, foreign ownership,
product markets, rm structure, geography and agglomeration in the survival and exit of plants.3
Dunne et al. (1989) and Dunne et al. (2005) emphasize the role of plant size as one of the
determinants of plant exit. The selection models of Jovanovic (1982) or Pakes and Ericson (1998)
suggest that newly born plants go through a process of learning including but not limited to
acquiring capital, training the workforce, and establishing distribution networks. Small plants
may not have easy access to labor, capital or resource markets, which in turn may increase their
operating costs and force them to exit earlier than a larger rm. Therefore, as plants get older
and bigger they are more likely to remain. There are many single-country studies conrming these
ndings.4
Producing multiple products plays an important role in determining plant survival. Multiprod-
uct rms are larger and more productive than single-product ones. For example, Dunne et al.
(1989) nd that while 59% of rms produce a single product, multiproduct rms account for 91%
3 Interested readers can refer to the comprehensive surveys of this literature such as Audretsch and Siegfried
(1992), Siegfried and Evans (1994), and Caves (2007). Syverson (2011) emphasizes the role of entry and exit
at the micro level for determining aggregate productivity.
4For example, Bernard and Jensen (2007), and the works cited in the Introduction. Some of these studies
rely on qualitative choice models such as probit and multinomial logit while others use duration models.
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of output in a sector. Moreover, there are sunk costs associated with producing multiple products
which reduces the incumbent competition and thus the probability of plant exit. Bernard and
Jensen (2007) nd supporting evidence for this argument. Granted, multiplant and multinational
rms are not the same, but they have many common traits.
Plant level productivity is also an important determinant of plant exit. Recent models of
heterogeneous rms in international trade (Melitz, 2003 and Bernard et al. 2003) and their an-
tecedents (Jovanovic, 1982; Ericson and Pakes, 1995 and Olley and Pakes 1996) all predict that
low productivity plants are more likely to exit the industry.
The business literature has considered the issue of divestments from two broad perspectives:
nancial studies and the corporate strategy perspective. Financial studies put special emphasis on
the e¤ect of divestment on company performance. In this literature company performance is often
measured by share prices and therefore divestment decisions are seen as reecting the demands
imposed by the nancial markets.
Markides (1995) and Padmanabhan (1993) present evidence suggesting that usually after a
divestment share prices increase for the seller. One obvious reason for this boost in performance
after the sale of a plant is the poor performance of the sold plant itself. However, another reason are
misguided acquisitions motivated by corporate diversication strategies that bring about subsequent
divestitures of the mist plants. In the context of the theory below, the reason is the sale of a lower
quality a¢ liate and the resulting investment in the higher quality a¢ liate, which lowers cost.
Corporate strategy perspective takes its central thrust from the strategic management literature
where divestments are seen as part of the product life cycle hypothesis. Divestment is a natural
stage of business in declining industries (Harrigan, 1980). Another motive to divest in the corpo-
rate strategy perspective comes from the constant evaluation of the rm from both nancial and
strategic points of view. Haynes et al. (2000; 2003) in studies of the UK nd that divestments are
systematically related to nancial, corporate governance and strategic variables. In their study of
208 divestments made by New Zealand rms between 1985-1990 Hamilton and Chow (1993) nd
that strategic considerations, such as expansion into related industries and divestment from non-
core business, matter. However, they also nd that one of the most important objectives motivating
divestments is the need to meet corporate liquidity requirements.
In light of this literature our papers contributions are twofold. While earlier work almost uni-
formly emphasizes plant exit, our data demonstrate the overwhelming importance of plant sales,
i.e. divestitures, rather than complete shut-downs, and we explore its determinants. Moreover,
di¤erent from the existing empirical work we are able to explore the global restructuring of multi-
national rms. Most previous work explores the exit of multiplant or multinational rms in one
country only. Unlike many national rms that exit the market altogether, multinational rmssales
of a¢ liates need not be synonymous with exit from a market and may even be accompanied by
expansion elsewhere.
4
3 Sketch of a Model
In this section, we verbally outline a model that can be used to generate theoretical predictions.
The model is a simplied version of Berg, Norbäck and Persson (2012) who study the interaction
of asset sales and investments in oligopoly. The details of the model are relegated to Appendix A.
The main assumption in Berg, Norbäck and Persson (2012) is that a rms borrowing cost
is decreasing in its cash holdings. Thus, divesting assets is a method to nance investments in
remaining assets or in new assets, since the selling rm not only gets cash to nance the new
investments, but will also reduce its investment cost from increased cash holdings. This assumption
is in line with the ndings of accountancy rm Ernst & Young from their 2012 Global Corporate
Divestment Study, which suggests that nearly 50 percent of divestments in the UK over the past
two years were driven by a need for quick cash. Ernst & Young interviewed nearly 600 corporate
executives from more than 14 sectors with wide geographic representation. Their ndings further
indicate that there are a number of companies taking a more strategic and structured approach
towards divestments even within these companies and many are using divestments to raise cash to
nance other investments.
Consider an MNC with two a¢ liates, which di¤er in quality. Suppose that each a¢ liate produces
a good under monopoly. At the outset, the MNC wishes to invest in the a¢ liates in order to increase
their productive e¢ ciency. However, since nancing costs increase in external borrowing, the MNC
cannot nance the restructuring of both a¢ liates. However, selling one a¢ liate enables the MNC
to nance the investment and restructuring of the remaining a¢ liate. Again, this occurs since the
sale of one a¢ liate increases the MNCs cash holdings which, in turn, reduces borrowing costs.
Now add a second rm (MNC or indigenous rm), which can potentially acquire one of the
MNCs a¢ liates. If a sale occurs, which a¢ liate is then sold and under what price, is determined
through Nash-bargaining between the rms. The model predicts that the two rms will agree on a
deal where the MNC sells the a¢ liate with lower quality, conditional on the quality of this a¢ liate
being above a minimum threshold. These results convey a simple intuition:
Since the acquiring MNC (or indigenous rm) becomes cash-constrained from borrowing to
nance the acquisition, it cannot invest in major restructuring of the acquired a¢ liate. Assuming
that implementation of the acquired a¢ liate into the buyers network is still costly, the acquired
a¢ liate needs to possess at least a minimum of inherent quality in order to generate value in the
acquiring rms network. Otherwise no trade occurs. This mechanism is also present in recent work
in the economics of innovation, where Serrano (2010) shows that transfers of innovations between
rms require a minimum quality in order to generate a transfer of ownership.
It is also in the interest of both rms that a trade of the a¢ liate with the lower quality occurs.
Intuitively, investing into the a¢ liate with the best business opportunities creates the largest gain
for the selling MNC. However, since rms bargain over the sales price, the buying rm is better o¤
from such a deal as well. The reason is that the selling MNC transfers some of the benets from
the investment into the high quality a¢ liate to the buyer through a lower sales price.
Summing up, the model predicts that the pattern of divestitures within a MNC should be such
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that (i) a¢ liates up for potential sale need to be of su¢ ciently high quality and, (ii) for a¢ liates
that do hold su¢ cient quality, the MNC will sell the a¢ liate with the lowest quality.
4 Data and Empirical Model
4.1 Data
The core data come from surveys of Swedish multinational rms conducted by the Research Institute
of Industrial Economics (IFN). These surveys were conducted in regular intervals since 1965, with
the last one in 2003.5 The survey provides detailed information on the operations of these rms in
Sweden and abroad. It is unique in a number of ways. It provides a wealth of data on sales, inputs,
trade, etc. It also asks about any foreign a¢ liates and provides information for each a¢ liate as
well as the economic relationship between the parent and the a¢ liate.6
For the central purpose of this paper, we utilize a question that was asked for the rst time in
the 2003 survey. The question asks whether a rm has acquired, started-up, closed or divested an
a¢ liate between the last survey year, 1998, and 2003. There are 1644 potentially usable a¢ liates in
the 2003 survey spanning 77 countries and 21 industries, listed in Tables 1 and 2. Of those, 228 were
acquired or started-up and 110 were closed or divested since 1998.7 Our dependent variable takes
on the value of one for each a¢ liate that was closed or divested and zero otherwise. In practice,
only one a¢ liate was reported closed, all others were divested.8 Similarly, most new a¢ liates were
acquired, very few were started-up. Appendix B contains a more detailed description of the history
of these surveys in general and more details about the 2003 survey utilized here.
We supplement the survey data with industry and country level data from various sources.
The industry level minimum e¢ cient scale data come from Statistics Sweden and report sales,
employees, the number of rms and other data for two-digit industries in Sweden. We have data
on regulations that vary by industry and country from the OECD, as collected by and described in
detail in Conway and Nicoletti (2006). Data on GDP, labor and capital at the country level come
from the Penn World Tables. Education data is from Barro and Lee (2010 update).
4.2 The Empirical Model
There are several empirical implications emanating from the model sketched out in Section 3. This
subsection enumerates these. The assets are proprietary (or rm-specic) assets which represent
5With many Swedish multinationals now foreign-owned, the surveys were discontinued.
6The Swedish multinational data have been used elsewhere. For example, Braconier and Ekholm (2000)
use it to estimate cross-elasticities of labor-demand among high- and low-wage countries. Davies et al.
(2009) look at the e¤ect of tax treaties on a countrys attractiveness for multinational investment. Tekin-
Koru (2012) examines the asymmetric e¤ects of trade costs on mergers & acquisitions versus greeneld
investments.
7Unfortunately, only 261 can be linked to at least some information from prior surveys, thus constraining
the use of other a¢ liate and rm level control variables.
8Results do not change when that a¢ liate is omitted from the analysis.
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knowledge about how to produce a cheaper or better product. This knowledge could take the
specic form of a patented process or it might simply rest on know-how shared among the employees
of multinational rms. In the MNC literature, the size of operations and extensiveness of these
rms-specic assets have proven to be highly correlated (Caves, 2007). Therefore, we will use
a¢ liate/rm size as an indicator of the quality of rm-specic assets owned by the rm.
The theory then suggests that an a¢ liate is more likely to be divested when it increases in size:
if an a¢ liate is too small and thus has low quality assets, its purchase will not give the acquirer
a positive net return. However, given that an a¢ liate is su¢ ciently large it will still be relatively
small within the MNCs network to be a candidate for divestment.
These predictions produce a tension between the e¤ect of larger a¢ liate size on the divestment
decision: One the one hand, a larger a¢ liate becomes a more likely candidate for a divestiture as
size indicates that the quality of the assets inherent in the a¢ liate is su¢ cient to induce the acquirer
to participate in a deal. One the other hand, if a larger a¢ liate size indicates higher quality assets,
the MNC has an incentive to invest in that a¢ liate, making it less likely that the MNC would want
to sell it.
We attempt to capture these two opposing e¤ects of a¢ liate size on the divestment decision
using the following probit estimation model:
Pr(Divestaj = 1jsizeaj ; rel_sizeaj ;X) = 
 
0 + 1
(+)
sizeaj + 2
( )
rel_sizeaj +X
0
!
(1)
where Divestaj takes on the value one when an a¢ liate has been divested, (:) is the normal
distribution, sizeaj is the size of an a¢ liate and rel_sizeaj is the a¢ liates size relative to other
a¢ liates in the network. We expect 1 > 0 as a¢ liates require a minimum quality to be eligible for
a deal. In order to capture the second implication of the model, we calculate a relative a¢ liate size
measure whose value increases when the a¢ liate becomes a larger one relative to other a¢ liates in
the MNCs network and thus we expect 2 < 0. That is, an increase in relative size reduces the
likelihood of the a¢ liate being sold. We now turn to a description of the size variables as derived
from the data as well as a discussion of additional control variables expected to a¤ect the likelihood
of divestiture.
We start with the core variables, sizeaj and rel_sizeaj ; that we are interested in from the
theory.
A¢ liate size: Ideally, sizeaj in equation (1) should be measured by quantity produced or sold.
However, consistent information on these variables is not available in the data set. Therefore,
we proxy size by the current number of employees Laj for surviving a¢ liates and the number of
employees at the time of exit for those that are divested. We use this variable in logarithmic scale
since a¢ liates vary considerably in size:
sizeaj = log(Laj ) (2)
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where Laj is the number of employees in a¢ liate aj .
A potential concern with measuring a¢ liate quality in terms of the log employment size log(Laj ),
is the labor saving e¤ect of asset quality. One might worry that a¢ liates with higher quality assets
may generate large sales but then have very few employees. We do not believe this to be a large
problem. In Appendix B, we show that under plausible conditions, employment and asset can be
positively correlated.
Moreover, whether or not asset quality indeed increases employment is an empirical question.
We checked this by running regressions of the log of a¢ liate sales on the log of a¢ liate employment
using a¢ liate xed e¤ects, country-industry pair xed e¤ects and numerous other specications
making use of the other survey years (which lack the divestiture information on a¢ liates, but
have sales). These regressions consistently produce a positive and statistically signicant elasticity
ranging from 0.6 to 1. A signicant, strictly positive elasticity of sales with respect to employment
suggest that asset quality drives both sales and employment, as suggested by the theory, and,
therefore, that we can use a¢ liate employment to proxy for a¢ liate asset quality.
A¢ liate relative size: Now we turn to rel_sizeaj in equation (1). Since it is not obvious how
to measure relative size, we will do it several di¤erent ways.
First, we measure rel_size as the size of the a¢ liate relative to average a¢ liate size of the rm,
rel_sizeaj =
LajP
aj2z
Laj=Az
(3)
where
P
aj2z
Laj is the total number of employees in a¢ liates of rm z and Az is the total number of
a¢ liates of rm z. This measure adjusts for general size di¤erences among rms. If rel_sizeaj is
greater than 1, then the a¢ liate is larger than average.
Alternatively, we consider the share of the a¢ liates employment in total a¢ liate employment
in the country (m) or region (r),
size_shareajm =
LajP
aj2zm
Laj
or size_shareajr =
LajP
aj2zr
Laj
(4)
Irrespective of whether we calculate the size share in the host country or host region, the size share
variable takes values between 0 and 1 naturally. As it gets closer to 1, the relative importance of
the a¢ liate in the host country or in the host region increases for the rm.
4.3 Additional Variables
A¢ liate size, size, and a¢ liate relative size, rel_size or a¢ liate size share, size_share, are the core
variables in our analysis. These variables are generated from the model. To assess the robustness of
these variables, we will also add a number of control variables. We rst complement these variables
with information on the rms network of a¢ liates and other characteristics of the mother rm.
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Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the data. It shows the network of rm z. Firm z is active
in the home country and in four foreign countries, distributed over two regions. Firm z has ve
a¢ liates distributed over the four countries. We now turn to how we calculate di¤erent rm level
variables for the rms in the data.
Other A¢ liate(s): It may be the case that the probability of divestiture is higher for plants with
geographically close or in rms with a greater number of other a¢ liates. Concentrating production
in fewer plants may allow a rm to better exploit plant level scale economies. Moreover, when other
plants are present in the same market, some divestiture does not equal leaving a market altogether.
Bernard and Sjöholm (2003) [Indonesia], Mata and Portugal (2004) [Portugal], Görg and Strobl
(2003) [Ireland], Bernard and Jensen (2007) and Alvarez and Görg (2009) report higher exit rates
for multiplant rms. To assess the importance of having other a¢ liates in the same country/region,
we construct a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the a¢ liate is part of a rm with at
least one more a¢ liate in the same country/region,
oth_affzm =
(
1
0
if 9 at least one other a¢ liate of rm z in country m
otherwise
(5)
oth_affzr =
(
1
0
if 9 at least one other a¢ liate of z in region r but not in country m
otherwise
(6)
Number of Other A¢ liates: Rather than an indicator variable, we use the number of other
a¢ liates of rm z in the same country/region, namely num_othaffzm and num_othaffzr.
Other Acquisitions: A rm can also restructure its operations by switching sectors or acquiring
plants at the same time others are closed down or divested. This can happen in the same host
country, in the same host region or anywhere in the world.
Related recent empirical studies conducted in the single country framework are Bernard, Jensen
and Schott (2006) and Greenaway et al. (2008, 2009). The former authors consider the decision
to cease production or switch sectors following being exposed to higher competition from low wage
countries. They nd that rms with low capital and skill levels are less likely to survive in the face
of increased competition from abroad and rms switch to more capital and skill intensive sectors
when exposed to lower levels of foreign competition. The latter authors consider rm choices
between alternative exit strategies, namely, close-down, switching sectors or being acquired, using
a multinomial probit model.
To assess the importance of whether or not having entry elsewhere, in the form of an acquisition
or a start-up within the same rm z, a¤ects a¢ liate a, we consider a dummy variable at the country,
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regional and global level,
oth_acqzm =
(
1
0
if 9 at least one acquisition by rm z in country m
otherwise
(7)
oth_acqzr =
(
1
0
if 9 at least one acquisition by rm z in region r but not in country m
otherwise
(8)
oth_acqz =
(
1
0
if 9 at least one acquisition by rm z anywhere
otherwise
(9)
Acquiring or opening a plant in another country could signal an intention to relocate production,
for example to a lower-cost location, attesting to the footloosenature of multinationals. It is also
consistent with the spirit of the model. Since an acquisition depletes cash reserves and thus increases
the nancing constraint and prevents investing in existing a¢ liates, it should raise the probability
of divestiture of another a¢ liate in order to ease the constraint and enable investments.
Other Divestiture(s): In the model, we could have multiple divestitures (as long as not all
a¢ liates are sold). However, the model is too simple to capture the entire set of dynamics which
link multiple divestitures. We also note that the e¤ect of divestitures or exits in other regions or
countries has not been examined in the single country framework of previous literature. To control
for these, we dene a dummy variable for other divested a¢ liates within the same rm z, again at
the country, regional and global level,
other_divestzm =
(
1;
0;
if 9 at least one other divestiture within rm z in country m
otherwise
other_divestzr =
8><>: 1;0;
if 9 at least one other divestiture within rm z in region r
but not in country m
otherwise
other_divestz =
(
1;
0;
if 9 at least one other divestiture within rm z anywhere in the world
otherwise.
Controlling for other divestitures is important as rms often face negative shocks that a¤ect
multiple plants similarly. As a result, closures or divestitures are likely to be correlated across
the rms a¢ liate network. Alfaro and Charlton (2009) o¤er a complementary explanation for a
positive correlation of the existence of a¢ liates within a country. They nd evidence of what they
call intra-industry vertical FDI. At the four-digit industry level, there exist a¢ liates of an MNC
that produce specialized inputs for other a¢ liates in the same industry, thus making it more likely
for an a¢ liate to be divested when there are other divestments.
Degree of Internationalization: This variable measures the relative importance of foreign
sales of rm z in total sales,
for_sale_sharez =

Fz

z
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where 
Fz =
P
m6=Swe;
P
aj2zm;
PajQaj and 
z =
P
m;
P
aj2zm;
PajQaj denote the foreign and global sales
of rm z, respectively. A higher value indicates a higher degree of dependence on international
markets.
Labor Productivity: As has been shown in the burgeoning literature on heterogeneous rms
(Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al., 2003), higher productivity rms are more likely to export and are
more likely to be multinational and have a lower probability of leaving the market than lower
productivity rms. Since a rms productivity originates from rm-specic assets in, for instance,
technology and managerial skills, and the services of these assets can be moved across locations
of a rm at low cost, the mother rms productivity may inuence the decision to divest. As
productivity is heterogeneous across industries, we measure a rms productivity relative to its
two-digit industrys average productivity. Firm z is said to have a higher than industry average
labor productivity if
rel_lab_prodz =
(
z   
Fz )=(Lz   LFz )

l=Ll
> 1
where LFz =
P
m6=H;
P
aj2zm;
Laj and Lz =
P
m;
P
aj2zm;
Laj and 
h=Lh is the two-digit industrys average
productivity in Sweden for the industry l to which rm z belongs. Note that since our industry
level information is from Sweden only, we use only the Swedish portion of sales to calculate this
measure.
Industry characteristics that we use in this paper are somewhat broader compared with some
used in previous empirical work due to the unavailability of sector level sunk costs and concentration
ratios for a number of countries that the Swedish multinationals operate in.
Sunk Costs: In general, high industry sunk costs should reduce the likelihood of a¢ liate exit,
although it is less clear what the e¤ect is for a divestiture. Hopenhayn (1992) shows that exit
probability of existing plants in a sector is low if there exist high entry barriers or sunk costs since
they face less erce competition than otherwise, leading to hysteresis (Dixit and Pyndick, 1994).
Dunne et al. (1989), Geroski (1991a,b) [UK], Bernard and Jensen (2007), Greenaway et. al (2008,
2009) and Inui et al. (2010) support this conclusion. Our measure of sunk costs is the minimum
e¢ cient scale (average rm size in number of employees) in the industry of the parent rm in
Sweden. It is a stylized fact that large scale signals higher entry barriers and thus higher sunk
costs. This measure varies by rm size categories. For example, if a rm has 200 employees, we
use the average rm size of Swedish rms that have between 100 and 249 employees.
Regulation: The degree of competition should have an e¤ect on divestiture decisions as it directly
a¤ects an a¢ liates prots. On the one hand, higher market concentration may lead to higher mark-
ups in a sector, which should reduce the exit probability (Audretsch, 1995). On the other hand,
competitive pressure by rivals in highly concentrated markets can cause immature exit. While
Burke, Görg and Hanley (2008) nd a negative impact of concentration on plant survival, i.e., new
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plants are vulnerable to large incumbents with monopolistic power, Alvarez and Görg (2009), using
Chilean data, nd no signicant impact of concentration on the probability of exit. As a proxy for
concentration we use the potential costs of anti-competitive regulation in certain non-manufacturing
sectors for sectors in the economy that use the output of non-manufacturing sectors as intermediate
inputs in the production process. Although this is not a direct measure of concentration, it varies
by industry and country and thus has broader international coverage than standard measures of
concentration such as a Herndahl index or a rm-concentration ratio. As we do have information
on which industry rms belong to, we will in addition use industry specic e¤ects.
Our country level variables are mainly drawn from the traditional FDI literature (for example,
Brainard 1997; Markusen 2002; Carr et al. 2001; Blonigen et al. 2003) to control for the role of
country specic attributes in multinational a¢ liate exits. To measure income and size, we use the
log of real gross domestic product of country m, GDP. To measure openness to trade, we use the
variable Trade Opennesswhich is the log of trade volume divided by GDP in country m. To
control for the education level of the work force, we use the log of average years of secondary or
tertiary education attained in country m, Skill. We also control for the productivity of the host
country with the log of the capital-labor ratio in countrym, K-L Ratio.9 Finally, some specications
will only use country-specic e¤ects.10
5 Results
We start of by providing information on country and industry coverage as well as simple summary
statistics for our basic sample of a¢ liates. As can be seen from Table 1, Swedish MNCs have
operations all around the world and operate in all the major industries (Table 2). Recall that
while the unit of observation is the a¢ liate and the basic question is what determines the survival
or divestiture of an a¢ liate over a ve-year period, many of these determinants are at the rm,
industry or country level or a combination thereof. Therefore, we group the variables used in
the analysis by their level of aggregation. Table 3 provides some basic summary statistics for the
sample. We have at most 1559 usable observations. Of these, 110 are a¢ liates that exited between
1998 and 2003 while the rest did not.
5.1 Preliminaries
Before going into a detailed econometric analysis, we provide a couple of pieces of simpler in-
formation to characterize the data and the determinants of a¢ liate divestiture. We start with a
mean-di¤erence analysis of our data. Table 4 compares the means of characteristics for retained and
9We tried a bevy of other country level variables, such as a more general market access variable as in
Braconier et al. (2005), GDP per capita, capital and labor endowments. These generally proved statistically
insignicant and in any case did not alter any of the main results.
10Since acquisition and divestiture happen over a 5-year time period, we tried various years for these
variables. It turns out that the results do not hinge on which year is chosen. For skill (education), only the
year 2000 is available.
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divested a¢ liates. Note that some of these can be computed at the country or regional level, while
others only exist globally. ,  and    indicate whether the means are statistically signicantly
di¤erent at the ten, ve and one percent levels, respectively. We rst note that divested a¢ liates
tend to be larger, as measured by the number of employees, consistent with the theory. However,
as with all the raw numbers in this table, we caution that only a conditional analysis will show
whether these unconditional di¤erences hold up once we control for the full set of determinants of
a¢ liate divestiture.
The model also asserts that an a¢ liate is more likely to be divested if it is small relative to
other a¢ liates. Since it is not obvious how this should be measured, we construct several di¤erent
measures, as discussed above. One is the size of an a¢ liate relative to the average size of a rms
a¢ liates (Relative Size); the other is the share of this a¢ liate in the a¢ liate network of a rm,
either in the same country or region (Size Share). The Size Sharemeasures both indicate that
divested a¢ liates are signicantly smaller relative to other existing a¢ liates in the same country and
the same region while the di¤erence is not statistically signicant for the Relative Sizemeasure.
It is important to note that the theory implies that in any regression, both absolute a¢ liate size as
well as relative a¢ liate size must be included simultaneously. The two are of course also related.
When the absolute size of an a¢ liate increases, its relative size rises as well, holding other a¢ liates
sizes constant.
Many rm characteristics di¤er signicantly between retained and divested plants. Divestiture
is more likely when there exists another a¢ liate and when the number and size of these other
a¢ liates is large. This is consistent with the hypothesis that restructuring takes place and there is
not a complete exit from a market. This is underscored by the fact that a sale is also more likely
when there is an acquisition elsewhere, whether in the same country, the same region, or anywhere
globally within the same rm. At the same time, restructuring does not appear to be limited to
one a¢ liate, but a¤ects multiple ones as divestiture is also more likely when there is divestiture
elsewhere, again regardless of how we dene the relevant geographic boundary. Finally, rms of
divested a¢ liates are relatively less productive than those of retained ones.
Interestingly, neither industry nor country characteristics appear signicantly di¤erent for re-
tained and divested plants. For the latter in particular, however, we note that this may simply be
due to the much smaller degree of variation as all a¢ liates located in the same country face the
same values for any of the country level variables.
Next, we turn to a visual examination of plant sales at the rm, industry and country level.
First, we dene a compact measure of a¢ liate divestiture, namely the divestiture rate, at the rm,
industry and country level.11
The divestiture rate at the rm level is the number of divested a¢ liates of a multinational rm
in a certain country divided by the total number of a¢ liates of the same rm in the same country,
including both those retained and those sold. Figure 2 shows the divestiture rate drawn against
their share of foreign sales, which can be viewed as the degree of internationalization of Swedish
11We are unable to report our country level gures for condentiality reasons. In these gures we observe
that countries with bigger markets and stronger demand experience a lower degree of a¢ liate divestiture.
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MNCs. As rms get more actively involved in foreign operations they start having access to external
and internal resources to overcome negative shocks. However, these rms may also be "footloose"
and have the exibility to close or sell a plant. Figure 2 shows that as the foreign sales share
rises, the divestiture rate falls. For example, among Swedish MNCs with a more than 80% foreign
sales share, 58 a¢ liates were divested between 1998 and 2003. There were 508 retained a¢ liates of
these rms in the same countries, giving an divestiture rate of 58/(58+508)=10%. In other words,
90% of the a¢ liates of Swedish MNCs with a very high degree of internationalization remained
between 1998 and 2003. This preliminary result goes against the footloose MNCs arguments in the
literature.
Figure 3 illustrates the divestiture rate at the industry level. In the automobile sector, for
example, 32 left out of a total of 255 and thus the divestiture rate is 13%. In high sunk cost
industries such as automobiles or fabricated metals the divestiture rates are low. However, there
does not seem to exist a very clear pattern and further analysis is necessary.
5.2 Probit Results
We turn now to our probit results, which can be found in Tables 5-7, as enumerated in (1). We
start o¤ simply in Table 5 by only including the variables suggested directly by the theoretical
model, absolute and relative a¢ liate size. Recall that the model implies that (absolutely) larger
a¢ liates are more likely to be divested, but those that are small relative to other a¢ liates in a
rms network. We measure this relative size either relative to the average size of an a¢ liate or
relative to the size of the a¢ liate network in the same country or the same region. The results in
Columns (1)-(3) are as predicted by theory. Divestiture is more likely the larger the a¢ liate, but
the smaller it is relative to other a¢ liates. Since the measure of relative size does not a¤ect the
results, we will subsequently focus on results using the Relative Sizevariable. We emphasize at
this point already that the signs and signicance of the two central variables remain robust to the
inclusion of other controls, as discussed subsequently.
In Figure 4, we translate these estimates to the simple model with two a¢ liates sketched in
Section 3 and shown in detail in Appendix A. Using specication (i) in Table 5 (without calculating
marginal e¤ects) the probability to divest a¢ liate a1 is Pr(Divesta1 = 1jsizea1 ; rel_sizea1) =

  3:1 + 0:39sizeaj   0:23rel_sizeaj. We then let the size of these two a¢ liates run from 1 to
6000 employees and calculate sizea1 and rel_sizea1 over this range using (2) and (3). The resulting
probability to divest a1 is shown as the surface in Figure 4.
Several things can be noted. Holding the size of a¢ liate a2 constant at the average number
of employees in the data (255 employees) and increasing the number of employees in a¢ liate a1,
increases the probability of divesting a1. This is consistent with the conjecture that the acquiring
rm will be interested in targets of higher quality (as measured by larger size). However, the increase
in the probability to divest a1 is decreasing in the size of a2 . The concavity in the probability to
divest comes in part from the functional form of the size variables but also reects the model
prediction that the MNC will want to sell the least productive a¢ liate in order to invest in the
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more productive one.
To illustrate the latter e¤ect more clearly, we then hold the size of a¢ liate a1 constant at the
average number of employees in the data (255 employees) and then increase the number of employees
in a¢ liate a2. As can be seen, making the a¢ liate a2 larger will also increase the probability of
divesting a1. An increase in the size of a2 - and hence a decrease in the relative size of a1 - signals
that a2 is the more productive one, and hence that a2 is the a¢ liate that the rm will want to keep
and invest in.
Let us now turn to controls calculated from the network of the rm. The rst set of additional
variables included is the presence of another a¢ liate as well as whether there is another divestiture
or an acquisition. Column (4) shows results for measuring these at the country level, Column
(5) at the regional level. Another divestiture robustly raises the probability of divestiture, but
an acquisition elsewhere does not. This indicates that restructuring does not occur via shifting
a¢ liates around, but by generally decreasing the number of a¢ liates. These are the rst set of
empirical results about global restructuring of a multinational without ignoring plant divestitures.
Replacing the dummy for the presence of another a¢ liate with the number of other a¢ liates
does not change the result with respect to other acquisitions and divestitures, although the number
of a¢ liates does not appear to matter for the divestment decision, only whether there remains
a presence in a country. As a nal check of the robustness of our central results, Columns (8)
and (9) include both measures of relative size and both measures of the presence of other a¢ liates.
Absolute a¢ liate size remains robustly positively correlated with divestiture, relative size negatively.
Divestiture still begets divestiture, but acquisition elsewhere does not.
In Table 6, we successively add other rm, industry and country level variables. The basic
variables that proved robust in the previous set of results are included every time. For the variables
that can be computed at either the regional or the country level, the latter was chosen. None of
the results would change if we instead chose the regional level ones.
The degree of internationality is negatively correlated with divestiture, as expected, although
it is not consistently statistically signicant.12 The industry level variables, on the other hand, do
not show any signicance. This could be because there is less variation at that level. Including
the regulation measure (in Column (3)) reduces the number of observations signicantly, since it is
only available for OECD countries, eliminating most developing countries from the sample. Since
it also turns out to be statistically insignicant, as in Alvarez and Görg (2009), indicating no major
impact of concentration on divestiture, we omit it in subsequent regressions.
Country level variables show some statistical signicance. When they are included, standard
errors are adjusted for clustering. Divestitures are less likely in larger markets. Greater openness
to trade weakly appears to raise the likelihood of an a¢ liate sale, although replacing this variable
with a market access measure results in no signicance of the coe¢ cient. A countrys capital-labor
ratio is also weakly negatively correlated with divestiture. As this variable is roughly a proxy for
the level of development, it indicates that the sale of an a¢ liate is more likely in less developed
12 Including instead or additionally the square of this variable also does not a¤ect the results and does not
produce consistent statistical signicance either.
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countries. This is consistent with the notion that the types of industries found in such countries
tend to be more footloose. Other country characteristics, including capital and labor endowments,
results of which are not shown for space reasons, are not statistically signicant.
In Table 7, regressions (1)-(3) include various types of xed e¤ects. Naturally, when we include
these, we have to omit some variables. For example, the inclusion of country xed e¤ects in column
(1) necessitates the omission of all country level variables as we have no time variation in the sample.
Nonetheless, all prior results hold. Likewise, the inclusion of industry or region xed e¤ects changes
none of the basic results, making us condent of their robustness. Finally, regression (4) includes
an additional dummy for the rm that has the most a¢ liate divestitures in the sample. While this
weakens some results, for example other divestitures are no longer signicant, many of the results
hold up. In particular, the absolute and relative a¢ liate size remain signicant with their signs as
predicted.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the decision of a multinational rm to divest a foreign a¢ liate.
Predictions for which a¢ liates are likely to be divested were based on a model in which the primary
motive to divest an a¢ liate is to nance other investments in the network of the MNC. Using data
on the entirety of global operations of Swedish MNCs, we were able to analyze the divestiture
decision in the context of rmscomplex location strategies that involve all possible locations. This
is in contrast to much of the existing literature which has focused on rm operations in a single
country to study the characteristics that a¤ect the survival probability of plants.
In line with the theory, we nd that larger a¢ liates are more likely to be divested although these
a¢ liates are small relative to the operations of the rm in the same country or region. These results
show that divestitures are the product of a complex restructuring e¤ort within the multinational.
The results also show that the sale of an a¢ liate is generally not tantamount of exit from a market.
The presence of other a¢ liates in the same country or region is positively correlated with the
likelihood of divestiture.
The results with respect to other divestitures and acquisitions are interesting. In these data,
there is no evidence of footloosemultinationals as divestiture is not correlated with acquisition
elsewhere, regardless of where that is. In contrast, divestitures appear to be correlated across the
rm network.13
Another noteworthy result is that more internationally engaged rms are found to be less
likely to divest, perhaps because their international experience and exposure makes for a more
established and stable a¢ liate network, unlike rms that are on less sure footing and thus more
prone to missteps. Finally, among the industry and country level variables, where there is much
less variation in the data by denition, the results that are statistically signicant are as expected.
13We caution, however, that this result is largely driven by the rm with the most divestitures in the sample
since including an indicator for that rm in the last regression of Table 7 makes the statistical signicance
of the coe¢ cient on other divestituredisappear.
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Firms are less likely to divest from larger markets and from countries with greater market access.
While we believe that this paper helps to ll an important gap in the literature on multinational
exit by focusing on divestitures, which are much more common than plant closures, and being able
to link these sales to the global operations of the rm, there is considerable scope for future
work. Most obviously, it will be important to see whether the Swedish experience is typical for
MNCs headquartered elsewhere. The biggest obstacle is the availability of data. While some
commercial databases, such as Bureau van Dijks Amadeus, have rich information on MNCs from
many countries, they generally lack the detailed data on a rms global network that we had
available. Still, the data situation is likely to improve in the near future.
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Table 2: List of Industries
SNI92 Industry
10 Mining and quarrying of energy producing materials
15 Food products
17 Textile
18 Wearing apparel, fur
19 Tanneries, luggage, handbags, footwear etc.
20 Wood and products of wood, cork, cane etc. , except furniture
21 Pulp, paper and paper products
22 Publishers and printers, recorded media
24 Chemicals and chemical products
25 Rubber and plastic products
26 Other non-metallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
29 Machinery and equipment
32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
36 Furniture
45 Construction
51 Wholesale and retail trade
85 Health and social work establishments
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Table 3: Summary Statistics and Expected Signs
Expected Unit Mean Median Standard
Sign Deviation
Dependent Variable
Divest (A¢ liate Divestiture) dummy 0.069 0 0.254
A¢ liate Characteristics
A¢ liate Size + employees, ln 4.328 4.248 1.531
Relative Size - (given size) 1.029 0.408 2.158
Size Share (Country) - (given size) 0.413 0.216 0.404
Size Share (Region) - (given size) 0.126 0.018 0.252
Firm Characteristics
Other A¢ liate (Country) dummy 0.760 1 0.427
Other A¢ liate (Region) dummy 0.929 1 0.257
Number of Other A¢ liates (Country) count 5.475 3 6.602
Number of Other A¢ liates (Region) count 37.19 22 37.07
Other Acquisition (Country) dummy 0.400 0 0.490
Other Acquisition (Region) dummy 0.726 1 0.446
Other Divestiture (Country) dummy 0.244 0 0.430
Other Divestiture (Region) dummy 0.463 0 0.499
Degree of Internationalization share foreign sales 0.715 0.785 0.206
Labor Productivity see text 1.074 0.951 0.981
Industry Characteristics
Sunk Costs - see text 1,050 836.8 555.3
Regulation see text 0.100 0.101 0.036
Country Characteristics
GDP Real $, ln 13.23 13.41 1.492
Trade Openness trade/GDP, ln 4.127 4.065 0.547
Market Access see text 26.72 27.10 1.880
Skill years school, ln -0.721 -0.618 0.613
K-L Ratio ln 10.96 11.29 0.790
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Table 6: Probits of Plant Divestiture on A¢ liate, Firm, Sector and Country Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A¢ liate Size 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.055*** 0.059*** 0.060***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Relative Size -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.039*** -0.050***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Other A¢ liate 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.062* 0.072*** 0.068*** 0.096***
(Country) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.022) (0.024) (0.029)
Other Acquisition -0.010 -0.008 0.010 0.012 0.016 0.012
(Country) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Other Divestiture 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.066*** 0.058*** 0.062*** 0.058***
(Country) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Degree of Inter- -0.047 -0.060* -0.110** -0.042 -0.052 -0.058
nationalization (0.032) (0.034) (0.044) (0.036) (0.036) (0.040)
Labor Product. -0.009 -0.012 -0.014 -0.008 -0.009 -0.022
(0.006) (0.008) (0.020) (0.006) (0.008) (0.015)
Sunk Costs -0.00002 -9.3E-06 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00003
(0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Regulation 0.270
(0.247)
GDP -0.014** -0.013* -0.019***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Trade Openness 0.024 0.036*
(0.018) (0.020)
Market Access -0.006
(0.004)
Skill 0.015 0.032** 0.017
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
K-L Ratio -0.021* -0.005
(0.012) (0.013)
Observations 1,526 1,525 1,056 1,518 1,420 1,339
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.17
Notes: Standard errors are computed using the delta method (in parentheses).
*, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Probits of Plant Divestiture on Characteristics - Unobserved Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A¢ liate Size 0.055*** 0.067*** 0.061*** 0.049***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Relative Size -0.034*** -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.040***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Other A¢ liate 0.076*** 0.090*** 0.099*** 0.078***
(Country) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027)
Other Acquisition 0.026** 0.012 0.018 0.018
(Country) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Other Divestiture 0.048*** 0.034** 0.057*** 0.011
(Country) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
Degree of Inter- -0.050 -0.214*** -0.057 -0.162***
nationalization (0.035) (0.052) (0.039) (0.036)
Labor Productivity -0.011 -0.010 -0.020 -0.031*
(0.009) (0.021) (0.016) (0.018)
Sunk Costs -0.00002 -0.00003 0.00002
(0.00001) (0.00002) (0.0001)
GDP -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.012**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Market Access -0.007* -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Skill 0.015 0.029* 0.019
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
K-L Ratio. -0.001 -0.004 -0.001
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Country Fixed E¤ects? Yes No No No
Industry Fixed E¤ects? No Yes No No
Region Fixed E¤ects? No No Yes No
Most Exits Fixed E¤ect? No No No Yes
Observations 1,523 1,340 1,339 1,339
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.22
Notes: Standard errors are computed using the delta method (in parentheses).
*, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Figure 1: A rms network of a¢ liates over countries and regions.
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Figure 2: Divestiture and degree of internationalization
30
Figure 3: Divestiture by industry
31
Figure 4: Divestiture and size
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Appendix A: Details of the Theoretical Model
This Appendix discusses the details of the model sketched out in Section 3. The model is a
simplied version of Berg et al. (2012). Consider two rms, H and F . Firm H is a multinational
rm which has two a¢ liates, a1 and a2. These a¢ liates may be located in the same host country
or in separate host countries. There is also a foreign rm, F . For the sake of simplicity, the foreign
rm is assumed to have only one a¢ liate f:14
Berg et al. (2012) analyze mergers and acquisitions with nancial constraints. The main
assumption is that nancial constraints a¤ect rms cost of capital which, in turn, a¤ects their
ability to conduct investment after an ownership transfer. As shown in Kaplan and Zingales (1997),
the capital cost is higher under external nancing due to information, agency or risk aversion
problems. For instance, if rm F buys a¢ liate a1, this will reduce its cash holdings. The reduction
in cash holdings will increase its investment cost as it will be more costly for rm F to nance
new investments (as lenders will demand a higher interest rate). In contrast, rm H, the seller
of a¢ liate a1, will see an increase in its cash holdings, which reduces its borrowing costs for new
investments.
In the remainder of the section the following timing of events is assumed: In the rst stage rm
H can sell one of its a¢ liates to rm F . In the second stage, rms decide on whether to make an
investment in a new asset k to reduce their costs. The third and nal stage is the product market
interaction.
To highlight the main mechanisms and get predictions for our empirical analysis of divestitures
of the a¢ liates of Swedish MNCs, we will further simplify Berg et al. (2012). Firm H decides
on whether or not to sell and rm F decides whether or not to buy. Due to the sale of one of
its a¢ liates, rm H increases its cash holdings and invests in a signicant improvement of the
remaining a¢ liate. Financing costs are assumed to be too high to improve both a¢ liates. On the
other hand, since the acquisition reduces Firm Fs cash holdings, Firm F cannot make such an
investment.
In the next three subsections, we analyze under what conditions rm H will sell an a¢ liate to
rm F and which of the two a¢ liates is sold. We rule out that rm H sells both a¢ liates, as the
Swedish MNCs to remain in the data set need to have at least one producing a¢ liate (i.e. remain
an MNC). To shed more light on the mechanisms, we assume that each a¢ liate holds a monopoly
and that there are no network e¤ects or spillovers between a¢ liates or competition e¤ects between
rms. We discuss a relaxation of these assumptions below.
Stage 3: Product market
The set of rms in the industry is Z = fH;Fg and the set of a¢ liates is A =fa1; a2; afg.
Let the action of an a¢ liate aj 2 A be xaj . Let laj denote the ownership of the a¢ liate aj where
laj = fh; fg. Here, h is used to indicate that an a¢ liate is owned by rm H and f is used to indicate
that an a¢ liate is owned by rm F . Let aj (xaj ;laj ) be the variable prot in an a¢ liate aj when
the ownership of a¢ liates is laj and the a¢ liate action is xaj . From the simplifying assumption
of monopoly, aj (xaj ;laj ) =

Paj   caj (laj )

Qaj ; where Paj =    Qaj is the inverse demand. Paj
is the price of the product made by a¢ liate aj , Qaj is its output and caj (laj ) is the marginal cost
under the ownership laj . The rst-order condition is Paj   caj (laj ) =Qaj from which we have the
optimal output and reduced-form prot for a¢ liate aj as usual:
Qaj (laj ) =
  caj (laj )
2
; aj (laj ) =
h
Qaj (laj )
i2
(10)
14 It is easy to extend this framework into a network of several a¢ liates.
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Stage 2: Investment
At this stage, rm H decides whether or not to invest in a marginal cost reduction  in a¢ liate
aj at cost G . Formally, we assume that:
caj (laj j) =c0   kaj   < caj (laj j0) =c0   kaj (11)
where caj (lj j) is the marginal cost in a¢ liate aj when the cost reducing investment is made and
caj (laj j0) is the marginal cost when no investment is made. Here, kaj > 0 represents the investment
in rm-specic assets (such as human capital of employees, patents, blueprints and procedures)
which provide cost savings to the rm.
As noted, we study rm Hs decision to sell an a¢ liate and we assume that only a su¢ cient
increase in cash-holdings allows a rm to invest in new rm-specic assets in order to signicantly
reduce its marginal cost. To capture this, let Gz(la1 ; la2) be the investment cost for rm z. We
then assume that
Assumption 1 (i)GH(h; f) = GH(f; h) = G < GH(h; h) and (ii)GH(h; f) < GF (h; f); GH(f; h) <
GF (f; h), GH(h; h) = GF (h; h)
Part (i) formalizes that investment costs are lower for rm H if it sells an a¢ liate. Again,
this mirrors the assumption that nancing is less costly when rm H sells one of its a¢ liates and
increases its cash holdings (assuming a positive sales price which will be shown to hold below).
Part (ii) says that rm F as the buyer of one of rm Hs a¢ liates will have a higher investment
cost. Again, this arises because when paying a positive acquisition price, rm F faces a reduction
in its cash holdings and therefore an increase in its nancing costs. We further assume that
Assumption 2 (i) a1(hj) GH(h; f) > a1(hj0), (ii) a2(hj) GH(f; h) > a2(hj0) and (iii)
aj (hj) G(h; h) < aj (hj0) for j = f1; 2g
Thus, rm H can always nance an investment in its remaining a¢ liate if it sells the other
a¢ liate and cannot invest in both plants at the same time. We also assume that
Assumption 3 (i) a1(f j) GF (f; h) < a1(f j0), (ii) a2(f j) GF (h; f) < a2(f j0) and (iii)
af (hj) GF (h; h) < af (f j0)
Firm F as the acquirer will see a reduction in its cash holdings which makes it impossible to
invest in a cost reducing asset.
Finally, rm F incurs a transaction cost T when buying the a¢ liate. An acquisition is potentially
protable if and only if aj (f j0) T > 0; j = f1; 2g. In order for a foreign acquisition of a¢ liate
a1 or a2 to be potentially protable, the product market prot under an acquisition aj (f j0) must
exceed the transaction cost associated with a deal, T .
Stage 1: Divestment decision
We start our analysis by outlining the details of two cases: Divestment of a¢ liate a1 and
divestment of a¢ liate a2. To proceed, let z(l1; l2) =
X
lj2z
aj (lj j:) be the aggregate product market
prot for rm z, where (l1; l2) is the vector of ownership of the a¢ liates a1 and a2.
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A¢ liate a1 is divested Given Assumptions 1-4, the Nash-Bargaining product in a negotiation
over the sale of a¢ liate a1 is:

a1(S) = [F (f; h) S   T  F (h; h)][H(f; h) G+ S  F (h; h)]1  (12)
where F (f; h) =a1(f j0) + af (f j0) is the aggregate variable prot for rm F when rm F buys
a¢ liate a1, F (h; h) =af (f j0) is the aggregate variable prot of rm F when no acquisition takes
place (status quo prot), H(f; h) =a2(f j) G is the variable prot for rm H when it sells a¢ l-
iate a1 and invests in upgrading in its remaining a¢ liate a2. Finally, H(h; h) =a1(hj0)+a2(hj0)
is the status quo prot for rm H. Here,  stands for the bargaining power of rm F .
The associated acquisition price of a¢ liate a1 is given as S1 = argmaxS 
a1(S); or:
S1 = (1  )[F (f; h)  T  F (h; h)]  [H(f; h) G H(h; h)] (13)
From (12), it is then useful to dene RF (f; h) = F (f; h) S1   T   F (h; h) as the net gain for
rm F from agreeing to buy a¢ liate a1 at price S1 : Furthermore, dene RH(f; h) = H(f; h)+S

1 
G  H(h; h) as the net gain for rm H from agreeing to sell a¢ liate a1at price S1 : Inserting the
acquisition price S1 from (13) in Rz(h; f), we obtain:
Rz(f; h) =

RF (f; h) = [(f; h) (h; h)]
RH(f; h) = (1  ) [(f; h) (h; h)]
(14)
where (f; h) =F (f; h)+H(f; h) is the aggregate prot when rm H sells a¢ liate a1 at S1 and
(h; h) =F (h; h)+H(h; h) is the aggregate prot when no deal is made.
A¢ liate a2 is divested Given assumptions 1-4, the Nash-Bargaining product in a negotiation
over a sale of a¢ liate a2 is:

a2(S) = [F (h; f) S   T  F (h; h)][H(h; f) G+ S  F (h; h)]1  (15)
In (15), F (h; f) =a2(f j0) T + af (f j0) is the aggregate variable prot net of the transaction
cost when rm F buys a¢ liate a2, F (h; h) =af (f j0) is again the aggregate variable prot or rm
F when no deal takes place. H(h; f) =a1(f j) G is now the aggregate variable prot net of
the investment cost for rm H when it sells a¢ liate a2 and upgrades its a¢ liate a1, and nally,
F (h; h) =a1(hj0)+a2(hj0) is the status quo prot for rm H.
The associated acquisition price of a¢ liate a2, S2 = argmaxS 
a2(S), is then:
S2 = (1  )[F (h; f)  T  F (h; h)]  [H(h; f) G H(h; h)] (16)
As above, dene RF (h; f) = F (h; f) S1   T  F (h; h) as the net gain for rm F from agreeing
to buy a¢ liate a2 at price S2 . Furthermore, dene RH(h; f) = H(h; f)+S

1   G   H(h; h) as
the net gain for rm H to sell a¢ liate a1 at price S2 . Inserting the acquisition price S2 in (16) in
Rz(h; f) we obtain:
Rz(h; f) =

RF (h; f) = [
(h; f) (h; h)]
RH(h; f) = (1  ) [(h; f) (h; h)]
(17)
where (h; f) =F (h; f) T+H(h; f) G is the total aggregate prot when rm H sells a¢ liate
a2 at S2 to rm F , and (h; h) =F (h; h)  T +H(h; h) is the aggregate prot when no deal is
made.
35
When does a divestiture occur and which a¢ liate is divested?
To guide the empirical analysis, we investigate whether rm H divests an a¢ liate and if so
which a¢ liate is sold. We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the quality of a¢ liate assets a1 and a2 are such that ka2 > ka1. Then,
(i) rm F will only agree to buy a¢ liate aj if the quality of its assets kaj are su¢ ciently high, i¤
kaj > k
min =
p
T   (ii) If both a¢ liates have a su¢ ciently high quality kaj > kmin, rm H and
rm F will agree on a divestiture of a¢ liate a1 which has the lowest asset quality.
Let us rst prove Proposition 1(i).15 Note that Firm F must obtain a positive net prot from
acquiring a¢ liate aj at a zero price at Sj = 0 in order to have an incentive to buy the a¢ liate
(ruling out negative prices). This net prot is
aj (f j0) T (18)
From (10) and (11), a strictly positive net prot aj (f j0) >T implies kj > kmin =
p
T   .
Intuitively, in order to cope with the transaction cost inherent in an acquisition, the quality of the
acquired assets must be su¢ ciently high.
Let us then prove Proposition 1(ii). Note that from (14) and (17) both rm H and rm F will
prefer a divestment of the a¢ liate which gives the largest increase in aggregate prot. Both rms
agree that it is in their interest to have rm H sell a1 if and only if this will give rise to a higher
aggregate prot than the sale of a¢ liate a2, (f; h)>(h; f).
We can rewrite the latter condition as follows:
(f; h) (h; f) = H(f; h) H(h; f)| {z }
Firm Hs incentive to sell a1 rather than a2
  [F (h; f) F (f; h)| {z }]
Firm Fs incentive to buy a2 rather than a1
= a2(hj)  a1(hj)  [a2(f j0)  a1(f j0)] > 0
= 2(ka2   ka1) > 0 (19)
Thus, aggregate prot will be higher if rm H sells a¢ liate a1 and then invests in a¢ liate a2. This
happens because the quality of the assets in a¢ liate a2 is, by assumption, higher, ka2 > ka1 . To
see this, it is instructive to di¤erentiate (f; h) (h; f) in the cost reduction . Since ka2 > ka1 ,
output under an investment in a2 must be higher; Qa2(h) > Q

a1(h):
d((f; h) (h; f))
d
=
d [a2(hj)  a1(hj)]
d
= Qa2(h) Qa1(h) > 0 (20)
In short, larger cost savings when investing in the larger a¢ liate a2 nanced from selling a1
create the larger increase in aggregate prot. Since each rm gets a xed share of this increase,
both rms will prefer the divestiture of a1.
Finally, it is also interesting to explore how rm F is able to benet despite agreeing not to buy
the best a¢ liate. To see how, rewrite the acquisition price for a¢ liate a1 as follows:
S1 = a1(f j0)  T   (1  )[a2(f j) a2(f j0) G  T ] (21)
Firm F obtains a1(f j0)  T in net prot from buying a¢ liate a1which from (21) implies a rebate
on the acquisition price since S1 < a1(f j0)  T . The rebate is larger the larger is the increase in
variable prot for rm H from investing in a¢ liate a2, a2(f j) a2(f j0) > 0.
15Proposition 1 builds on Lemma 1 in Berg et al. (2012) where the size of the investment is endogenous
and where the roles as buyer and seller are endogenously determined.
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Discussion and Extensions
In this section, we briey discuss major results and some extensions of the model.
The rst result arises from the assumption of a transaction cost to be paid by the acquirer:
unless the quality of the a¢ liates assets are su¢ ciently high, there will be no surplus for the
buyer and hence no incentive to negotiate a deal. The second result is a direct consequence of the
assumption that nancing costs are a¤ected by wealth or cash holdings: selling an a¢ liate reduces
the costs for external nance which enables the MNC to invest in the remaining a¢ liate. We then
show that if the investment increases, this reduces marginal cost and the MNC will sell the a¢ liate
with assets of lower quality and then with cash received invest in the a¢ liate with assets of higher
quality. This produces the largest gain in prots since the reduction in marginal cost a¤ects more
units in the larger a¢ liate. The buying rm will also agree to this deal, as the larger gain for the
MNC from investing in the a¢ liate of higher quality will be mirrored by a lower acquisition price.
It is straightforward to extend the model to more than two a¢ liates. Let the set of rms be
Z = fH;Fg and the set of a¢ liates be A =fa1; ::at:::; aN ; afg where rm H initially owns a¢ liates
fa1; ::; at; :::; aNg, where each a¢ liate is a monopoly. Firms will then negotiate a price Sat for
a¢ liate at. As in (17), each potential deal will give rise to a net-prot for each rm which will be
the status quo prot plus a share of the increase in aggregate prot when a¢ liate at is sold (where
the share is given by the bargaining strength). Firms will agree on the price which gives rise to
the largest increase on aggregate prots. With a transaction cost present, a¢ liate aj needs to be
associated with a su¢ ciently high quality of its assets kaj in order to give rm F an incentive to
participate in the deal, in line with Proposition 1(i). However, it will also be the case that when
the quality kaj increases even further, it is more likely that rm H will keep a¢ liate aj and sell
another a¢ liate, as it will be better to invest into an a¢ liate with higher quality assets in order to
get a larger benet from the investment, in line with Proposition 1(ii). This would be true even if
we allowed for multiple sales of a¢ liates.
With several a¢ liates in a network we could also introduce synergies or network e¤ects. Also
in this setting, there must be an incentive for the buyer to participate: to be sold, the quality of
the assets must again be su¢ ciently high. The seller will also invest in the a¢ liate that gives the
highest synergy or strongest network e¤ects. Through the Nash-Bargaining process, the buyer and
seller would coordinate the outcome that increases aggregate prot the most. This implies that an
a¢ liate with better quality assets or assets with the potential to generate larger synergies will not
be sold. As shown in Berg et. al. (2012), this will be true even in a setting with product market
competition, since the acquisition price will adjust to take into account how rms are a¤ected in
the post-acquisition market.
Asset Quality, Firm Size, and Employment
Finally, we briey show that even in the simple monopoly, the number of workers can increase
in asset quality. To see this, note that the number of workers in an a¢ liate before a divestiture or
investment is Laj (z) =
 
c  kaj

Qaj (z). It can be shown that if the marginal cost is su¢ ciently
low, c 2 (kaj ; kaj + 12), a¢ liate employment Laj (z) increases in kaj . Note also that all results
remain the same if we assumed that consumerswillingness to pay is Paj = + kaj  Qaj and that
marginal cost is caj = c; in particular, Proposition 1 still holds. Then, since there is an increase in
output resulting from higher asset quality, a¢ liate employment Laj (z) will always increase in the
quality of the assets kaj as well.
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Appendix B: The IFN Surveys of Swedish Multinationals
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics has surveyed multionational rms headquartered
in Sweden in 1965, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2003. The objective from the
beginning was to survey the universe of manufacturing rms with at least 50 employees that are
based in Sweden but have at least one a¢ liate abroad (Ekholm and Hesselman, 2000). It provides
a wealth of information on the operations of these rms both in Sweden and abroad.
The high response rate from the early survey years began to fall in the 1990s. In particular,
the response rate on the operations of a¢ liates abroad dropped more in the 1998 survey than that
of the headquarters. Thus, in 2003, a particular e¤ort was made to capture those rms with the
largest number of a¢ liates abroad in order to obtain the most comprehensive information about
them possible. Thus, the 2003 sample covers about 85 percent of all employees in the foreign
a¢ liates of Swedish MNEs (just over 400,000), up from 81 percent in the prior survey (Hakkala
and Zimmermann, 2005). Thus we believe that this survey provides a representative and near
comprehensive picture of the universe of Swedish MNEs.
While many questions are asked in every survey, the 2003 one added one that asked whether
an a¢ liate was acquired, newly opened, divested or closed between 1998 and 2003. Of the 110
exits, all but one were divestitures and it is this information that we use in constructing our
sample. Because of this question and the availability of information for all existing a¢ liates of the
responding rms, we can construct the network of a¢ liates for all rms in the sample. Since the
survey is condential, only summary statistics and results can be reported that do not disclose
the identity of any individual rm or a¢ liate. Also note that we went through all the actual
response questionnaires to ensure that no mis-codings or omissions introduced error into any of the
rm networks. This could easily happen as there is a separate sheet lled out for each a¢ liate in
addition to the questionnaire for the headquarter rm.
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